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Executive Summary
The integration of new technologies into the public transit industry has resulted in improved
service offerings to customers. But while these new services provide important information and
conveniences to transit customers, they may also provide access points for nefarious actors who
want to disrupt or cripple operations. As in other industries, the increased application of digital
technologies in public transit (e.g., service delivery, customer interactions, and back-office
operations) brings with it a new assortment of digital risks. Unfortunately, many U.S. public transit
agencies are not prepared for these risks.1 Transit agencies of all sizes have found themselves
subject to cyber incidents, most notably ransomware attacks that resemble those experienced by
larger, more prominent companies and critical infrastructure providers. The transit industry needs
to expand and mature its cyber preparedness in a timely manner but is unlikely to be able to do so
without assistance.
U.S. transit agencies are highly dependent on the services of external vendors to help in the delivery
and maintenance of many critical technologies linked to everything from ticket purchases to
scheduling to email management. A vendor"s cybersecurity posture—whether immature or
advanced—is shared with its clients. The transit industry and its vendor community have the
opportunity to broaden their mutually beneficial relationships with a focus on cybersecurity. In this
case, both parties need to create security environments that benefit from and augment each other.
The authors of this report conducted interviews with key vendors in the public transit industry
with the intention of learning more about the current state of cyber security in public transit from
the vendor perspective, how this translates to contractual requirements and service delivery, and
how operators can become more cyber-savvy clients. Our findings, which are presented in an
anonymized fashion, focus on three key areas: cyber literacy and procurement practices, the
lifecycle of technology vis-à-vis transit hardware, and the importance of embracing risk as a road
to resiliency.
Many vendors remarked in their interviews that transit agencies need to use the procurement
process as an opportunity to clearly articulate their cyber expectations and needs because the
presence of such requirements in requests for proposals (RFPs) is a key driver of investment for
vendors. It is important, however, that agencies have a sense of their own risks and have the ability
to communicate these risks in technical terms that align with the actual needs of the organization
or service delivery being sought from the vendor. Keeping technical teams, especially security
personnel familiar with agency cyber requirements, integrated into the procurement process is one
way to address some of these hurdles.
Transit vendors were nearly unanimous in their observation that the hardware and software
lifecycles in public transit are out of sync, creating a situation in which vehicles and other hardware
designed to last for 15 years or more are being supported by or carrying software that stopped
receiving security updates five years after it launched. This disconnect creates serious
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vulnerabilities. Transit agencies need to not only be on the lookout for software and firmware that
is obsolete and unsupported (and seek to remove or replace it as quickly as possible), but also
explicitly cite the need for vendors to provide ongoing service in RFPs. Agencies should anticipate
increased costs in the near term, but planning to avoid technology obsolescence is a worthwhile
security investment.
Finally, vendors acknowledged the importance of viewing organizational needs through lenses that
focus on risk and security and how understanding the difference is foundational for addressing
cyber risks. Security is a state of being which organizations take steps to protect themselves—
essentially creating an environment free from or resilient against harm. Risk, on the other hand, is
something that organizations would do well to accept as a constant chance or probability of
exposure to hazards. Risk is managed or mitigated to the extent possible, but it generally cannot
be eliminated. This mindset would not only help transit agencies in their own cyber risk
management but also positions them to gain more from their relationships with vendors.
The most impactful step a transit operator can take to strengthen their cyber resiliency is to
consolidate and elevate risk management as a core function of the organization that incorporates
all elements of risk, including cyber, into a single, focused effort. Known broadly as an enterprise
risk management (ERM) strategy, risk consolidation allows for the organization to operate as a
united front against the myriad risks that confront it daily. Taking this concept of an organizational
approach and broadening it to a whole-of-industry approach would provide benefits to all
stakeholders involved in ensuring public transit"s future success. The macro areas of focus for ERM
include people and process (who and how risk is managed), technology (by what means), and
governance (why and how risk should be managed).
There is a growing urgency for expanded regulatory guidance and directives regarding
cybersecurity for U.S. critical infrastructure, including public transit. A Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) Security Directive released in December 2021 specifically addressed cyber
for rail systems and was accompanied by a recommendation that other surface transportation
operators follow the directive as well. The authors anticipate that recent recommendations may
evolve into future directives as the government continues to mature its regulatory approach to
information security practices in the public and private sectors.
Finally, the report concludes with an outline of actionable steps that each of the key transit
stakeholders can and should be taking to help shore up the industry"s cyber maturity and ability to
counter today"s cyber risks. Vendors, transit agencies, transit associations, and the U.S.
Government all need to make targeted investments of time and resources to improve the cyber
resilience of U.S. public transit.
!
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1. Introduction
The U.S. public transit industry is in need of a twenty-first century security upgrade. Safety and
security are at the forefront of operations today, but generally do not address the wide-ranging
digital enhancements the industry is experiencing. Digital risks and exposure have grown as
agencies incorporate new technologies into all areas of their business, including service delivery,
back-office operations, customer interactions, and a multitude of third-party partnerships on
which agencies rely to keep the organization"s day-to-day operations in motion.
In this report, the authors present the findings of their research into the interface between public
transit agencies and their vendors regarding cybersecurity and risk management practices. This
builds on the work presented in the 2020 Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI) study, Is the
Transit Industry Prepared for the Cyber Revolution? Policy Recommendations to Enhance Surface
Transit Cyber Preparedness (2020 MTI Study), in which the authors reported on the growing
technology demands within the industry and the resulting exposure to myriad cybersecurity threats
for which most operators are unprepared.2
The findings of the 2020 MTI Study and research to date underscore the need for the public
transit ecosystem in its entirety (e.g., the agencies, vendors, trade associations, and regulatory
bodies) to elevate its collective understanding of and preparedness for cyber-related risks to
operations, data, and business infrastructure. Given the dependence transit agencies have on
vendors and the role and reach vendors have in delivering technology and services, the focus of this
paper is on the opportunities that exist for the industry to enlist the help of the vendor community
to support the improvement of cyber risk management and the steps transit agencies need to take
in order to create an environment that is able to collaborate with vendors.
Cybersecurity / The art of protecting networks, devices, and data from unauthorized access
or criminal use, as well as the practice of ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and availability
of information.

Based on follow-on research from the 2020 MTI Study, extensive interviews with vendors serving
the transit industry and the ever-evolving cyber threat landscape, the authors have assembled a
report designed to introduce or reacquaint readers with cyber risks posed to public transit agencies,
the expansiveness of the vendor community supplying hardware and software, and a vendor-led
view of cyber practices in transit. The latter half of the report focuses on the need for transit
agencies to implement risk management practices as an avenue for strengthening their respective
cyber capabilities and the U.S. regulatory environment that is nipping at the heels of transit,
spurred on by high profile cyber-attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure by foreign actors.
Finally, the authors offer a series of recommendations tailored to each of the stakeholders with a
role to play in maturing cyber risk management capabilities in public transit.
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2. Methodology
This report employed a multifaceted approach to research and document the status of public transit
agencies and their primary vendors !"cyber readiness with the goal of developing practical
recommendations to enhance those levels of preparedness. The report focused primarily on
vendors that work with public surface transit agencies that receive funding from the Federal Transit
Administration (FTA), are members of the American Public Transportation Association (APTA),
and operate within the U.S.

2.1 Literature Review
The authors reviewed available material from government agencies, including the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), TSA,
the Department of Defense (DoD), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
and the U.S Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT), as well as trade associations such as the
American Public Transportation Association (APTA), the American Association of State
Transportation and Highway Officials (AASHTO), and the National Academies of Sciences!"
Transportation Research Board (TRB). We also looked at best practices from other industries.
The authors supplemented the literature review with open-source research on recent cyber
incidents and innovative and emerging trends in cybersecurity. Many of the online resources filled
gaps in the literature where existing publications had not kept pace with cybersecurity practices
and innovations. The authors also attended and participated in several conferences, including the
2021 APTA TRANSForm Conference, 2021 APTATech Conference, 2021 California Transit
Association Annual Meeting, 2021 ITS World Congress, 2021 AASHTO Annual Meeting, 2021
ITS America Annual Meeting, and 2022 TRB Annual Meeting.

2.2 Review of Best Practices
The authors reviewed literature on physical and digital cybersecurity strategies in transit and other
industries and applied key findings from this review, as well as discussions with experts from both
operators and vendors, to develop the oral survey guide that was used to gather information for
this report. The researchers profiled the leading vendors as well as a number of companies in other
industries to level set current actions and identify best practices that can be shared with the vendor
community as well as operators.

2.3 Expert Interviews
With this background in place, the researchers worked with several transit operators to define the
key enterprise areas that are exposed to the highest level of cybersecurity risk and where they rely
on vendors to support these operations. Based on this input, the researchers focused on three
primary enterprise areas: bus operations technology, fare payment technology, and transit business
operations technology. The researchers assembled a list of large and small companies that provide
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support services to these enterprise areas and worked with APTA and its Business Members Board
of Governors (BMBG) to identify representative firms that might be willing to participate in indepth interviews. The researchers, with the support of APTA and the BMBG, sought in-depth
interviews with this target list and conducted interviews with suppliers providing the majority of
the services in these enterprise areas. Additionally, the researchers interviewed multiple public
agencies, trade associations, and Capitol Hill representatives.
Each interview included at least two researchers. With respect to the vendor interviews, the
researchers sought to hold interviews with the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO)/Chief
Technology Officer (CTO) (or top technology profession responsible for managing the
organization’s cybersecurity practices) and the top business development professional/technology
professional who deals with clients on their cybersecurity needs, if different. In the interview
process, the authors used scripted questions with each organization, though the discussion was
otherwise unstructured, which enabled the authors to explore specific experiences and anecdotes
that the interview subjects were able to share. A copy of the interview questions is attached as
Appendix C. To ensure a high level of openness and candor, the interviews were conducted on an
anonymous basis and a specific company or individual was only referenced with their permission.

2.4 Operational Recommendations
The report makes a series of recommendations for transit operators, transit vendors, the federal
government, and other industry actors on how to best refine their relationships to introduce more
rigor into their cybersecurity practices. The recommendations provide examples for how vendors
can mature their cybersecurity practices and provide agencies with guidance on how their contracts
and other practices can be employed to ensure clear expectations are conveyed to vendors. Neither
agencies nor their vendors alone can fully mitigate cybersecurity risk. The industry must work
together to address the growing threats to public transit that cyber-attacks pose.

2.5 Limitations of Study
The intent of this study is to assess the readiness, resources, and structure of public transit agencies
and their suppliers to identify, protect from, detect, respond to, and recover from cybersecurity
vulnerabilities and threats.3 Further, while the authors provide a description of the threats currently
facing the transit industry and their vendors, they did not specifically assess and examine emerging
technologies that will soon be widely used in transit, such as connected vehicles (i.e., vehicles that
communicate with each other to prevent crashes) or autonomous vehicles. The authors did not
assess the internal cybersecurity capabilities of any transit agency, vendor, or public organizations
with whom many agencies share data, such as trade associations and/or federal agencies such as
the U.S. DOT or DHS.
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3. State of Play: Cyber Risk in Public Transit
The past several years have proven to be marquee years for cyber-attacks against critical
infrastructure, including public transit agencies across the United States and Canada. Headlines
in 2020 and 2021 called out only a fraction of the costly disruptions and security breaches
governments and businesses experienced due to cyber-attacks. The 2021 Log4j vulnerability,
Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack, JBS Foods hack, Kaseya software attack, and the 2020
SolarWinds attack are some examples, along with many others which disrupted systems, software,
operations, and services, costing companies and governments exorbitant sums of money to clean
up the mess.
IBM, in its 2021 Cost of a Data Breach Report, cited a 10% year-over-year increase in the
average total cost of a data breach, placing the 2021 average at $4.24 million; the average
total cost of a ransomware breach was $4.62 million (not including the cost of the ransom).
These are the highest average total costs in the 17-year history of the IBM Security report.
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Case Study: Ransomware Attack on Mid-Sized Public Transit Agency
One Friday before a long weekend in 2021, a mid-sized transit agency on the East Coast of the
United States received a message that their system had been compromised by an outside actor,
that their data was no longer accessible, and that a ransom demand would be forthcoming. The
transit agency"s IT team responded swiftly, though with the incorrect assumption that they
could quickly turn to backups of their files and data to resolve the inconvenience. Unfortunately,
the sophistication of the hackers and the thoroughness with which the transit operator"s system
was hijacked meant that neither the agency nor its cadre of vendors could tackle the data breach
in a timely manner. What began as a minor disruption turned into a multi-week affair involving
professional ransom negotiators, lawyers, and public relations experts.
A vendor providing management services to the transit agency was immediately brought into
the incident in the hopes that they could assist the team in its response. The agency needed help
sifting through more than 50 file servers to determine the kinds of data the hackers had in their
possession. The servers were a mix of modern and legacy systems, with the legacy systems
containing personal data on thousands of pensioners. Without an understanding of who and
what would be harmed by the public release of the agency"s data (the hackers had threatened to
dump the data cache on the dark web), the team had no ability to conduct an effective risk
assessment or take mitigating steps. The IT team, in the midst of it all, had unfortunately shut
down all the systems, assuming this would limit additional harm. Instead, this further
constrained the assessment process and the agency"s ability to continue delivering uninterrupted
back-office services. It was a scramble and expensive learning experience for all involved.
Following the incident, the vendor reflected that it took for granted that the transit agency had
in place current policies, procedures, and contingencies to provide for cybersecurity. It was an
incorrect assumption. Despite healthy funding from the state"s Department of Transportation
(DOT) for new electric and autonomous technologies, sufficient funds were not made available
to maintain and upgrade existing systems. Given the size and scope of the agency"s needs,
annual requests for funding to modernize the agency"s systems could not be fully met. As a
result, neither the state DOT nor the transit agency were making adequate investments to
address the growing cyber risks associated with the agency"s technologies and data collection.
The agency was able to retrieve its data (though some of it was corrupted), albeit at a great
expense in terms of time and money. All it took was an errant click on a single phishing email
to bring normal operations to a screeching halt and put the agency"s lack of a business continuity
plan and cyber know-how on full display to its partners.

Public transit providers are seeing a similar uptick in the frequency and severity of cyber incidents.
The global transit industry, according to Check Point Research, has experienced a 186% yearover-year increase in weekly ransomware attacks since June 2020.4 The Bay Area Rapid Transit
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system, Southeast Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, Vancouver"s Translink, the Toronto
Transit Commission, O"ahu Transit Services in Honolulu, New York"s Metropolitan
Transportation Authority, Dallas Area Rapid Transit, Ann Arbor Area Transportation Authority,
and the Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority in California have each dealt with their own
data breaches or ransomware attacks in the past few years. It is increasingly difficult to name a
transit provider that has not faced a data breach or other disruptive cyber incident. In some cases,
transit agencies report clean cyber bills of health only because they are unaware of system breaches.
Neither the size nor the location of the transit agency makes the operator immune to attack.
Perpetrators of ransomware attacks on transit agencies are generally looking for financial payouts—
it is a business operation.
The public transit industry is also accelerating its adoption of digital technologies. Consumer
demands and expectations are changing significantly, driven in large part by consumer transactions
with other sectors and industries as the opportunity to improve how service is delivered continues
to grow. In public transit, a passenger increasingly begins their journey by reviewing schedules or
status of transit vehicles through a web-based portal or app. The app is also becoming a method
for purchasing an e-ticket, either validated as proof-of-purchase by a human conductor or through
a verification system on the conveyance.
Transit agencies are also becoming increasingly dependent on this connectivity to manage their
operations, from scheduling to depot parking and overall traffic management. As the industry
accelerates the use of first and last mile services and Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAV),
the digital interaction will only increase between the passenger and the broader ecosystem of
devices and applications that provide the service of moving people.
The delivery and management of transit operations are increasingly reliant on a highly connected
and cyber-dependent environment that is no longer bound by a self-contained network. Each
connected point of interaction that makes use of the internet for the exchange of information is a
vulnerable point of entry and may include, but is not limited to, passenger personal data, credit
card information, conveyance location data, and conveyance/depot status. It is also important to
note that this ecosystem extends beyond the passenger and transit provider; it includes the diverse
collection of vendors—service, hardware, and software providers—upon which the agencies are
dependent to fulfill their mandate. The vendor thus becomes more than a commodity purveyor;
they are entrusted with providing technologies that are critical to performing the agency"s mission.
!
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Figure 1: Threats to Transit Sector Value Chain5
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3.1 Vendor Community Serving Public Transit
The role vendors play in delivering public transit services varies by agency, but all rely on the vendor
community to provide technical support in some form. Public transit agencies are highly dependent
on these services from external vendors, both to ensure the consistent and reliable delivery of
transportation services and for the general operations of the agency. Some have outsourced much
or all of their operations; others maintain some in-house capabilities to manage day-to-day
technical needs. Agencies generally rely on vendors for Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS)
or services that automate service delivery (e.g., computer-aided dispatch, scheduling, passenger
counting), back-office services (e.g., the running of the transit agency—email, data storage), fare
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management, and, of course, the manufacturing of the actual vehicles. Vendors are often providing
some or all of the following services to their transit agency customers:
•

Ticket Purchases

•

Cloud Services

•

Fleet Management

•

HR Systems

•

Passenger Counting

•

Video Surveillance

•

Yard Management

•

Scheduling

•

Driver ID/Bus Access Real-Time Arrival

•

Fare Management

•

Data Storage

•

Vehicle Locations

•

Email Management

•

Cred Card Processing

The APTA 2021 Fact Book provides another view on the growing use of technology in buses over
the past 20 years. A review of the APTA figure illustrates a limited but demonstrative view of the
increase in potential threat vectors being added to current buses.6
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Figure 2: Transit Buses Continue to Add Amenities and Technology7
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APTA also observes that #a large portion of the funds expended by those [public transportation]
agencies, however, is spent in the private sector. In 2019, expenditures in the private sector were
estimated at $43.1 billion (57 percent of all transit expenditures), a 7.5 percent increase from $40.1
billion in 2018 (inflation-adjusted).”8 Given the historic increase in funding for transit in the
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), this number is likely to increase exponentially.
Figure 3: Public Transit Expenditures Flow to Private Sector9
EstimatedTransitExpendituresin the PrivateSector(In 2019dollars)
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Vendors play an important cybersecurity role with regard to their work with transit clients. A
vendor that has incorporated security as a core tenant of the service or product they deliver is, in
turn, sharing that layer of security with their clients. Similarly, a vendor with nonexistent or
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immature cybersecurity policies and practices can pass along that risk or exposure to their clients
via their product or service. This often occurs without the client or vendor"s knowledge.
Businesses serving the transit industry, however, are like other service businesses—they are going
to be responsive to the wants and needs of their customers. If customers do not place value on
security, it is unlikely to be a core component of either their sales pitch or the actual product/service
delivery. In this regard, the transit industry and its supply chain have an opportunity to broaden
their mutually beneficial relationships with a focus on cybersecurity.

3.2 Vendor Insights on Cyber Practices in Public Transit
Companies serving the public transit industry are in the beneficial position of learning their clients!"
specific needs while also maintaining a wider view of the industry—what agencies of different sizes
and in different regions need, how they use services, and what it is they are likely to request next.
In a series of in-depth interviews the authors conducted with many of the largest transit industry
suppliers in the U.S., vendors shared insights into the challenging relationships of industry
expectations for cybersecurity, how this translates to interactions with the supply chain, and the
recommendations cyber-proficient vendors have for individual agencies. Many of these vendors
also provide products and services to companies outside the transit sector, which gives them crossindustry context and access to best practices the transit agencies may wish to adopt from more
cyber-mature environments.
To protect the anonymity of the vendor companies that were interviewed, none of the anecdotes
or feedback included in this section is cited or attributed to a specific individual or company. The
authors have instead presented their aggregated findings and key themes from the interviews
combined with actionable takeaways. Most of these actions and recommendations come directly
from the vendors interviewed by the authors, who recognize that the quality of their service delivery
and reputations depend on delivering some level of security—to the extent that they can—to their
clients.
3.2.1 Cyber Literacy and Getting the Request for Proposal (RFP) Process Right
When asked specifically about their interactions with transit agencies, most vendors noted that
many of the U.S. transit agencies with whom they work or to whom they submit proposals do not
have the in-house cybersecurity know-how to clearly articulate their needs and expectations.
Without a basic understanding of cyber risk within their agency, it is nearly impossible for a transit
operator to adequately assess the product or service being procured and its impact on risk.
Overall, vendors are seeing an increasing number of RFPs that include cybersecurity provisions,
albeit in an inconsistent and somewhat incoherent fashion. Several vendors noted in their
interviews that the cyber requirements in many transit agency RFPs today are not a stretch for
them to meet because the agencies have not yet reached a level of cyber sophistication that requires
any major changes from vendors. While some vendors modified their cyber practices because they
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serve other industries that hold vendors to a higher standard, many vendors acknowledged that
their overall spend on cybersecurity had increased not due to client requests but because the
business viewed it as an essential component of their own operations and enterprise risk.
Vendors shared multiple anecdotes about the range of cyber requirements among their transit
clients. Some transit agencies, they noted, have limited or no cyber requirements or expectations
in their RFPs. Others go into a level of detail in their requests, including requiring vendors to have
specific certifications, which suggests that the RFP was assembled by an organization (perhaps
even a third-party consultant) without the ability to align with the agency"s internal understanding
of risk (if established). In some cases, vendors noted, they are seeing agencies pursue security for
security"s sake without a rational understanding of risk. This is apparent in RFPs that include
duplicative and often conflicting requirements.
In one case, a vendor received an RFP, for which they were otherwise well-qualified to bid on,
that required vendors to have a FedRAMP certification. The FedRAMP certification goes well
beyond the ISO 27001 and NIST 800-53 security and privacy controls that often serve as stepping
stones to the management of more mature information systems
ISO 27001: An international standards body headquartered in Switzerland that provides a
widely known set of requirements for information security management systems.
Organizations can become certified to ISO 27001 standards.
NIST 800-53: The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk
Management Framework provides a comprehensive process organizations can use to manage
information security and privacy risk.

FedRAMP is considered one of the more difficult certifications to achieve and includes third-party
assessment requirements as well as a review by a government authority. Companies providing cloud
data storage services to the federal government are generally required to achieve this level of
certification. From the vendor"s perspective, the transit agency requesting FedRAMP certification
as a condition of a successful bid did not have work that required that level of security, was not in
possession of federal data, and did not have in-house security requirements or policies that could
operate at that level of maturity. In short, the request for the FedRAMP certification for this work
was an indication that the transit organization did not know what it needed, did not have a level
of cyber literacy to communicate those needs in their RFP, and only served to unnecessarily
increase the cost of the response.
Such disproportional asks cost time and money. There is no need for a transit agency to pay for a
level of service it does not require. And FedRAMP certifications require frequent, ongoing
maintenance. This is a worthy investment if it aligns with the organization"s service delivery needs.
In this case, however, it was being used as an expensive catchall in place of doing the work to
understand the agency"s risk profile. Any organization requiring its supply chain to maintain this
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level of certification is going to have to pay for it. Similarly, vendors will have to make the business
decision about whether the cost of bidding for an RFP, which may sometimes include upgrades to
their own operations, is worth the investment.
Several of the vendors underscored their desire to see more informed cybersecurity requirements
in agency RFPs. This will likely improve the cyber posture of the industry, but it also allows more
mature vendors to distinguish themselves from their less cyber-mature competitors. Vendors
making investments in cybersecurity are looking for returns on these investments (although one
could argue that the improved security for their business and products is the primary ROI). The
transit industry—given its dire need for assistance in better securing its operations from cyber
threats—should reward those vendors that invest in and maintain reality-aligned cyber practices
with contracts. Cybersecurity needs to become a business development tool that serves as a key
differentiator among transit vendors. In parallel, agencies need to better educate themselves on
information security capabilities such that they can make more informed decisions concerning their
vendors.
The procurement process can be cumbersome, but a measured, deliberate, and thorough process
is required to vet, validate, and otherwise ensure vendors meet necessary standards to serve public
transit. An increased reliance on technology further underscores the central importance of getting
the terms of these relationships right. Part of the challenge, as highlighted by the Transportation
Research Board (TRB) in their 2022 study on Cybersecurity in Transit Systems, is that #there is
no transportation-specific, let alone transit-specific, guidance to assist in developing a cyber secure
procurement process and working with third-party software or vendors.”10
Transit agencies have an opportunity during the public RFP process, multiple vendors noted, to
secure services that incorporate modern cyber risk practices. Clearly stipulated cybersecurity
requirements that are commensurate with the actual needs of the agency can go a long way in
helping vendors to better serve transit clients, manage costs, and give transit agencies much needed
support in their pursuit of managing cyber risk. The cyber requirements in RFPs are a key driver
for investments in levels of compliance and certifications that vendors pursue to win contracts.
Getting the language right from the start of the RFP, therefore, is not only important for ensuring
that an agency gets what it needs, but it is also a means of improving an organization"s cyber
posture.
Agencies would also benefit from including a diverse team in the procurement process that, at
minimum, includes security personnel familiar with cyber requirements. Agency visibility into the
security practices of vendors is essential, especially if those vendors are to provide key systems or
handle sensitive data.
It is important for the transit agency"s leadership (technical or not) to work toward developing at
least a basic level of cyber literacy. This education can be supported by vendors, but much of these
learnings must be internalized by the agency, normalized for the industry, and integrated with the
broader public transit ecosystem. The agency"s technical teams must have a level of information
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security knowledge such that they can engage in cyber-literate discussions, both in-house and with
vendors. Even a basic understanding of cyber risk will enable better informed decision-making
about the technology, people, and financial resources required to keep the agency functioning in a
manner that aligns with its organization"s risk tolerance.
3.2.2 Managing the Technology Lifecycle
Transit vendors were almost unanimous in their agreement that hardware and software lifecycles
in public transit are out of sync. An agency, for example, may purchase several new buses for their
fleet with the intent that those buses will have a lifecycle of at least 15 years. Traditionally, with
good mechanics, the safety of the vehicle could be maintained for a long period of time. Today,
the technology built into buses—everything from video cameras to location tracking—requires
updates aligned to advances in technology and the ever-evolving list of threats that could
undermine the security of their operations. The software and firmware used to manage and operate
these devices, however, require updates on a timeline counted in months, not decades.
The result of misaligned lifecycles between hardware and software is that transit agencies are
increasingly finding themselves the owners of technology for which vendors no longer provide
security updates. If the lack of security updates did not have a direct link to passenger safety—the
key driver for many technology investments in public transit—the lack of regular security updates
would not be a priority. Keeping up with the latest tools of the technology industry is not a priority
for many transit operations. The connection between the physical security of the vehicle and the
digital technologies integrated into today"s operations, however, means that the technologies
present in the vehicles have a direct link to the security of passengers and others on the road.
This creates a conundrum for both the transit operator and the vendor. As vendors improve their
products, investment and attention are primarily paid to the most recent and advanced iteration
rather than coming up with solutions to secure a software package deployed a decade earlier. The
transit operator, however, often needs to find a way to extend the life of software to service
hardware that must last another five to ten years. If the software or firmware is no longer being
updated by the vendor or is physically not able to be updated, the agency has a problem. Running
software or a product with firmware that is not being updated means that previously unknown
vulnerabilities may exist and persist. Hackers or other individuals looking to disrupt the transit
service can exploit these vulnerabilities. Even updated software and firmware can have
vulnerabilities, but managing cyber risk in this case is akin to securing a home. Someone can break
into a home even if it has a moat, drawbridge, and Doberman, but it is going to be a lot more
difficult, which may send them off in search of an easier target. The easier target is a home with
an unlocked front door. The transit agency with software and firmware that is not being updated
is the latter.
When technology advances at a rate that far outpaces public sector budget cycles and costly
hardware investments, as the industry is experiencing today, changes need to be made to the
agency-vendor contract terms and the expectations of both parties. The authors heard in multiple
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interviews that vendors want to provide the best possible service to their transit customers, but the
expectation to maintain software and firmware on anything other than a technology-driven
timeline needs to be built into the contract such that the business can take steps to ensure they
allocate the time and resources to do so.
Some vendors have realized this disconnect and have taken steps to build service agreements into
their contracts. More service, however, leads to higher costs, especially with vendors that do not
price in ongoing maintenance and updates. Transit agencies, therefore, need to explicitly cite the
need for this level of ongoing service in their RFPs so that vendors can compete based on the actual
required scope of work. It is equally important for agencies to incorporate the cost-of-service
contracts into their budgets and capital planning.
3.2.3 Managing Risk and Strengthening Resiliency
Multiple vendor interviews highlighted a core concept that many transit agencies could benefit
from adopting—the importance for agencies to understand the difference between #security” and
#risk” and how understanding the nuances of each can help an organization to improve its cyber
posture. The line between the two concepts is thin, but it can ultimately impact how an
organization chooses to prepare for or embrace the challenges of incorporating more technology
and connectivity into its ecosystem.
Security is generally understood as a state of being free from or resilient to harm. The organization
responsible for security at a transit agency today is most likely responsible for implementing policies
and protocols designed to keep people safe—controlling points of access for buildings and vehicles,
planning for and training people to respond to physical security incidents (bomb threats, physical
altercations, etc.), among many other vital responsibilities.
If security is a state of being that organizations take steps to create, risk is the constant chance or
probability of exposure to hazards in everyday life. Risk is something to be anticipated, analyzed,
managed, and accepted. Steps can be taken to mitigate or reduce risk exposure to an individual or
organization, but it generally cannot be eliminated from a situation. This is true for cyber threats
as well.
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Figure 4: NIST Risk Management Framework

Essential activities to prepare the organization to manage
security and privacy risks
Categorize the system and information processed, stored,
and transmitted based on an impact analysis
Select the set of N1STSP 800-53 controls to protect the
system based on risk assessment(s)

lmP.lement

Implement the controls and document how controls are
deployed
Assessto determine if the controls are in place, operating
as intended, and producing the desired results

Authorize

Senior official makes a risk-based decision to authorize
the system (to operate)
Continuously monitor control implementation and risks
to the system

When it comes to cyber risks faced by public transit agencies, there is no situation where an agency
is absolutely free from danger or threat. As with most risks, cyber threats must be anticipated and
managed, which can seem daunting for organizations that have not yet taken the steps necessary
to bridge their traditional physical security practices with cyber risk management.
Cyber resiliency// The ability to anticipate, withstand, recover from, and adapt to adverse
conditions, stresses, attacks, or compromises on systems that use or are enabled by cyber
resources.
The good news is that most public transit agencies already have recovery and response plans in
place linked to threats posed by physical risks. Many operators are directly engaged in broader
disaster planning for their respective cities, with responsibilities to help move people as evacuations
are ordered in the face of natural or man-made disasters or community incidents. These plans are
meant to ensure enterprise resiliency—anticipating what could occur, the likelihood of such an
occurrence, and the potential resulting impact on the organization. Few of these plans, however,
incorporate the potential impact of cyber risk.
Embracing a holistic approach to managing risk that is inclusive of and informed by physical,
cyber, and information risks entails bringing what today are diverse elements of an organization
together to reimagine an enterprise-wide view of risk.
The adoption of a risk strategy inclusive of cyber threats enables an agency to articulate its
expectations for vendors—what a potential vendor needs to have in place in terms of security, how
the organizations!"respective risk programs can complement one another, and what gaps may exist
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that need to be addressed before contracts are signed. When an agency lacks a comprehensive
understanding of its risk, it is very challenging for vendors to pinpoint where and how they can
provide support. Consultants can assist in this process, but some vendors shared that
inconsistencies in priorities exist when the definition of risk is not incorporated into organizationwide policies and procedures. Transit agencies will be in a much stronger position to secure their
own operations and gain more from their vendor relationships when they take the steps needed to
establish a holistic risk framework.
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Case Study-Indiscriminate Cyberattacks: Community Services and Transit
A transit agency that provides essential transportation services to communities in need of
economic assistance seems an unlikely target for a ransomware attack. Unfortunately, most
cybercriminals do not discriminate based on an organization"s size, stature, or the nature of the
services they provide. They pursue access. In 2021, the seemingly unlikely victim of the cyberattack was a transit provider in the eastern United States. The organization"s systems were
accessed via a suspected phishing attack.
As a result of the attack, the transit provider lost all of its historic and current route data, as well
as client data. The agency"s internal work product, emails, and other operating documents were
stored on a second server that was also compromised. Although most of this data was not lost,
it took months of unbudgeted overtime and consulting services to unencrypt the files. The
organization decided not to pay the ransom, which left the agency to manually recreate their
scheduling logs from paper manifests. The operator was left in the unenviable position of
manually operating its schedule for months.
A system breach at this transit agency was seen as particularly unlikely by the leadership because
of its affiliation with a Community Action Agency (CAA). CAAs are local, public, and private
non-profit organizations that serve low-income communities by providing everything from
transit services to early child development programs such as Head Start. As the Executive
Director of this particular CAA mused, #we are the good guys, and we have nothing. Why would
they hack us?” The associated transit agency in this case provides roughly 80,000 fixed-route,
on-demand, and para-transit trips for individuals in need of access to essential services in the
community.
When the transit agency"s systems started shutting down, the CAA"s IT staff began the process
of shutting down the systems throughout the rest of the CAA. The entire organization was
taken offline—cut off from emails, work products, scheduling software, financial software, and
other daily business operational services. Fortunately, the non-transit CAA operations were on
different servers than the transit operator"s two on-premises servers, allowing them to isolate the
hack and eventually restart other CAA systems.
The CAA is beginning to work with its employees to establish a cyber-awareness culture but is
still in need of a comprehensive cyber assessment. The IT staff updated policies regarding
passwords, authentication methodologies, and data access and is sending regular educational
updates on cybersecurity scams, but there is still much more to be done. Competing priorities
and limited resources appear to be stalling efforts by leadership to implement change. More
solutions are needed to aid organizations like this CAA and their transit provider to improve
cyber practices and discourage cybercriminals from viewing them as easy targets.
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3.3 Managing and Mitigating Risk
One actionable takeaway from the research and interviews that were conducted for this report is
that a vendor can have a robust risk management program to support their clients, but unless the
client is able to take advantage of the vendor"s work, risk is neither managed nor mitigated. The
transit client must have a basic level of sophistication to integrate the risk program of the vendor
into their own. To better position themselves to develop an integrated risk relationship with their
vendors, transit agencies need to establish an understanding of their own risk posture that includes
both cyber and physical risks. Socrates !"adage of #know thyself” is the best place for agencies to
begin.
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is defined by the Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations (COSO) as “a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management
and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to
identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk
appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives.”
COSO, since its inception in 1985, has provided thought leadership on risk management
and governance among other topics related to the private and public sectors.
The authors believe the key to strengthening the broader transit ecosystem is a willingness to
consolidate and elevate risk management as a core function of agency leadership, incorporating
financial, operational, cyber, and other business risks into a single focused effort. Known broadly
as Enterprise Risk Management (ERM), such a strategy ensures executive attention to improve
cyber protections and preparedness to the same degree as other such risks are managed today.
There is a multitude of ERM resources transit agencies can consult to begin or advance industry
and organization-specific needs and interests. Many of these are industry agnostic, though there
are transit-specific materials under development. In the following text, the authors provide an
overview of the macro elements of ERM as applied to transit agencies and, more specifically, how
these elements apply to the agency-vendor relationship. The macro areas of focus include people
and process, technology, and governance.
3.3.1 People and Process
ERM is a whole-of-organization approach that acknowledges the importance of managing risk
not as a discrete set of actions, but as an integrated approach to reducing risk exposure that could
otherwise negatively affect the organization and those they serve. Given the challenges of the
industry and the growing threats it faces, the authors propose broadening the concept to a wholeof-industry approach, engaging agencies, vendors, and government to support the elevation of risk.
For most public transit agencies, a physical security team is responsible for providing security and
risk management counsel to the organization"s leadership. Many agencies already include #risk
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management” in the job descriptions and/or titles of their existing security team; some even include
cyber-related responsibilities. Technology, however, is most often managed by an entirely separate
organization. This segmentation presents a challenge given the interplay between cyber systems
and physical risk, and vice versa. Managing the connectivity between cyber risk and physical risk
is not a native challenge to public transit or even the transportation sector writ large. Organizations
of all sizes in every industry continue to iterate on the best way to manage this interface within
their respective organizations. Referred to as the cyber-physical convergence, CISA and others
have been researching and struggling to find answers for how to effectively manage this evolving
risk landscape.
Together, cyber and physical assets represent a significant amount of risk to physical security
and cybersecurity—each can be targeted, separately or simultaneously, to result in
compromised systems and/or infrastructure. Yet physical security and cybersecurity divisions
are often still treated as separate entities. When security leaders operate in these siloes, they
lack a holistic view of security threats targeting their enterprise. As a result, attacks are more
likely to occur and can lead to impacts such as exposure of sensitive or proprietary information,
economic damage, loss of life, and disruption of National Critical Functions (NCFs).11
Drawing from examples in financial services and energy, many organizations choose to unify and
elevate the role of risk management to encompass both the physical and digital domains, often
under a Chief Security Officer (CSO) or Chief Risk Officer (CRO). For some organizations, the
most effective way to ensure that this individual and her team can lead a whole-of-enterprise
approach to risk management is to have her report directly to the CEO. Other organizations have
this individual report directly to another member of the C-Suite. The important factor is for this
individual to have consistent visibility and access to leadership and the Board. As a member of the
executive team, the CSO should serve as the focal point for all security matters, with a focus on
ensuring compliance with agency guidance, maintaining and improving their organization"s
security posture and readiness, and leading assessments to ensure investments and actions are
informed and consistent with the organization"s risk environment.
Organizations with a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) or those that are working toward
developing a CISO role, should consider having the CISO and his or her physical security peer
both report directly to the CSO. The CISO, in this arrangement, leads the organization"s
information and data security, including incident response, identity and access management,
privacy, and the creation of standards and controls, among others.
Foundational to ERM is conducting and periodically re-evaluating a business or organizational
impact analysis. Led by the CSO, this executive effort begins with asking and assessing a few key
questions focused on understanding risks that could negatively impact:
•

Safe Operations

•

Lost Sales and Income Due to Business Disruption
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•

Brand and Reputational Harm

•

Delayed Sales or Income Due to Business Disruption

•

Increased Expenses (e.g., overtime labor, outsourcing, expediting costs)

•

Regulatory Fines

•

Contractual Penalties

•

Customer Dissatisfaction or Defection

•

Delay of New Business Plans/Investments

To effectively evaluate risk across the organization, the CSO should lead the creation and ongoing
work of an executive-level enterprise risk committee, where all aspects of risk are discussed,
debated, and defined for the organization. Only when the input from key operations owners is
incorporated can an appropriate assessment of risk be made. Periodically convening the risk
committee further emphasizes the fact that risk is a whole-of-organization effort.
Ideally, the agency"s risk infrastructure will also include some form of proactive risk identification
(i.e., external events or trends that could negatively impact the agency or internal vulnerabilities
that need to be watched) and documented steps for how the agency will resolve the incident with
minimal disruption to service delivery if it occurs. Industry information-sharing groups are an
important (and economical) arena for sharing and gathering threat intelligence, security best
practices, and vulnerability management insights. As more transit agencies determine what forms
of proactive risk identification would be most helpful to their day-to-day operations, they should
communicate them directly to their trade associations, the Public Transportation Information
Sharing and Analysis Center (PT-ISAC), and other informal groups whose support activities can
be tailored to the evolving needs of the group.
Once the risks are understood, an organization can more effectively determine how best to address
them. The agency will need to determine if they should accept, reduce, mitigate, avoid, transfer,
or control the risk area identified. With this important categorization, an organization can then
move towards prioritization, which will shape how they invest in appropriate actions that
strengthen the organization"s overall resiliency. Coupling a well-developed ERM strategy with
industry and regulatory guidance ensures not only compliance but also appropriate investments.

Identification

Categorization
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With this new risk baseline established, transit agencies should develop, codify, and document
policies for all aspects of the organization"s security program. These policies should be designed to
ensure consistency in action and should be enforceable as a means of maintaining accountability
and oversight. Policies should provide accessible strategies for maintaining security efficacy and
clearly define the standards for every individual accountable to each of these policies. Some version
of these documents may exist today, though they most likely do not address cyber incidents. If this
is the case, agencies should conduct a full review and work to incorporate cyber into each policy
and response mechanism.
•

Incident Response and Crisis Management Plans should ensure the right infrastructure is
in place to proactively identify risk indicators that could potentially affect the organization’s
security posture. This should also include the additional steps that need to be in place to
lead the organization through resolving the incident with minimal disruption. The CSO
should periodically test the organization’s tolerance for risk exposure in key and prioritized
areas through tabletop exercises and other means.

•

Resilience Plans should also include procedures for investing in various areas that minimize
disruption. In the cyber domain, it is no longer a question of if but when an organization
will face a ransomware attack. Investing in multiple backups of the organization’s sensitive
data and/or other security protocols ensures limited downtime when a breach occurs.

•

Communication and Training are key elements in developing a risk management culture
for an organization. Individuals need to be trained and have that training reinforced on a
regular basis. Communicating the importance of understanding and being prepared for a
variety of risks—whether it be an active shooter or a phishing email—and matching it with
appropriate awareness campaigns, exercises, and training will help to create the risk-aware
culture that can benefit any organization.

Most Agencies Do Not Have Many of the Basic Policies and Procedures in Place to Respond in
the Event of a Cyber Incident12
•

42% do not have an incident response plan; of those that have one, over half have not had
a drill in over a year

•

36% do not have a disaster recovery plan

•

53% do not have a continuity in operations plan

•

58% do not have a business continuity plan

•

67% do not have a crisis communications plan

MINETA TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE

23

Given the TSA requirement for rail operators to identify a cyber coordinator, all public transit
agencies should move towards having a fully integrated 24x7 Security Operations Center (SOC)
if and when they are able to do so. The authors acknowledge that this may be impractical or a long
way off for many transit operators, but a fully-integrated SOC is a best practice that operators
should be aware of. If a SOC is within reach for an agency, appropriate technology and headcount
investments should be made to ensure real-time discovery of potential risk indicators and ongoing
monitoring of business operations that impact resiliency, investigations, and response. The SOC
should include representation from key organizational functions and have access to corollary
resources among key vendors that directly support the ERM strategy and benefit from contributing
to incident/crisis management. The SOC should also include compliance representation as a role
to provide oversight and control to its efforts.
3.3.2 Technology
Once the organization understands its cyber risk exposure, the risk assessment will likely identify
key technology needs to reduce relevant risk exposure, standardize processes, and significantly
improve how an organization detects, controls, and responds to security risks affecting its
operations. Key technology investments include but are not limited to:
•

Identity and Access Management

•

Network Security

•

Data Protection

•

Email/web Security

•

Endpoint Security

•

Asset Management

•

Application Security

•

Physical Access Control Systems

Specialists exist who focus on providing such services, known as managed security service providers
(MSSPs). Larger agencies may have the resources to support some or all of this infrastructure with
internal resources; others should augment their team and engage with MSSPs that have experience
with and understand the transportation sector and public transit specifically.
A previously identified risk vector for most public transit agencies is the continued use and
dependency on legacy and/or unsupported software and hardware. The key is to document and
intentionally manage end-of-life (EOL) hardware and software. Only with this documentation
does the organization have visibility into the risks EOL infrastructure may pose to the
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organization. In addition to making efforts to replace EOL infrastructure in a timely manner,
operators should ensure that future implementations do not include firmware or software that is
not regularly supported for the entire duration of the life of the system. It is no longer tenable for
vendors to exclude at least basic security maintenance from their offerings; agencies should no
longer offer RFPs that do not explicitly call out and fund basic security maintenance for the life of
the system.
As transit agencies and their vendors work to strengthen their risk management capabilities, the
risk management approach of “Security by Design” should be central to how they develop cyber
policies and practices. Security by Design is based on the acknowledgment that risk can never be
fully avoided and that, instead, the processes by which software is designed, built, and deployed
should have built-in layers of security at every step.
!

!
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11 Security by Design Principles
1. Defense in Depth: Also known as layered defense, defense in depth is a security principle where
single points of complete compromise are eliminated or mitigated by the incorporation of a series
or multiple layers of security safeguards and risk-mitigation countermeasures.
2. Fail-Safe: A security principle that aims to maintain confidentiality, integrity and availability by
defaulting to a secure state, rapidly recovering software resiliency upon design or implementation
failure. In the context of software security, fail-secure is commonly used interchangeably with failsafe, which comes from physical security terminology.
3. Least Privilege: A security principle in which a person or process is given only the minimum level
of access rights (privileges) necessary for that person or process to complete an assigned operation.
This right must be given only for a minimum amount of time that is necessary to complete the
operation.
4. Separation of Duties: Also known as the compartmentalization principle, or separation of
privilege, separation of duties is a security principle that states that the successful completion of a
single task is dependent upon two or more conditions that are insufficient for completing the task
by itself.
5. Economy of Mechanism: In layman’s terms, this is the “Keep It Simple, Stupid” principle because
the likelihood of a greater number of vulnerabilities increases with the complexity of the software
architectural design and code.
6. Complete Mediation: A security principle that ensures that authority is not circumvented in
subsequent requests of an object by a subject, by checking for authorization (rights and privileges)
upon every request for the object.
7. Open Design: The open design security principle states that the implementation details of the
design should be independent of the design itself, which can remain open, unlike in the case of
security by obscurity, wherein the security of the software is dependent upon the obscuring of the
design itself.
8. Least Common Mechanism: The security principle of least common mechanisms disallows the
sharing of mechanisms that are common to more than one user or process if the users and processes
are at different levels of privilege. For example, the use of the same function to retrieve the bonus
amount of an exempt employee and a non-exempt employee will not be allowed. In this case the
calculation of the bonus is the common mechanism.
9. Psychological acceptability: A security principle that aims at maximizing the usage and adoption
of the security functionality in the software by ensuring that the security functionality is easy to
use and at the same time transparent to the user. Ease of use and transparency are essential
requirements for this security principle to be effective.
10. Weakest Link: This security principle states that the resiliency of your software against hacker
attempts will depend heavily on the protection of its weakest components, be it the code, service,
or interface.
11. Leveraging Existing Components: This is a security principle that focuses on ensuring that the
attack surface is not increased and no new vulnerabilities are introduced by promoting the reuse
of existing software components, code, and functionality. 13
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3.3.3 Governance
For agencies to elevate risk management as a priority, so too must the governing bodies that oversee
risk for the industry. As the Co-Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMAs) for the
Transportation Sector, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of
Transportation should prioritize publishing an update to the 2015 Transportation Systems Sector
Cybersecurity Framework Implementation Guidance. The vendor community is accelerating their
innovation across multiple technologies found commonplace in the sector. The interest and rise of
broad CAV adoption are creating new opportunities that enhance operational value while also
contributing to increasing the overall risk environment. What was once limited to concern over
potentially compromised consumer information and data now also includes the opportunity for a
threat actor to exploit cyber vulnerabilities that can control hardware and related autonomous
technologies.
The federal agencies should create a Sector Cybersecurity Executive with dedicated investment
and authority to establish sector and subsector cybersecurity guidance. The proposed Office of the
Cybersecurity Executive (OCE) should model this guidance based on NIST and industry best
practices, leveraging a Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) process relevant to the
sector. The standard should include prescriptive maturity levels à la the Department of Defense"s
Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC).14 The OCE should establish an oversight
and inspection capability to conduct periodic assessments and to certify at the established guidance
level all transit agencies under their purview, as well as any vendor that maintains (or seeks to
develop) an active contractual relationship with an agency.

3.4 An Expanding Regulatory Environment
In a threat environment punctuated by disruptions to critical services resulting from cyber
incidents, it should not come as a surprise that regulators are becoming more explicit about cyber
risk management expectations for public and private companies alike. Transit operators, regardless
of size, provide a critical infrastructure service in the communities in which they operate. The
Biden Administration, U.S. Congress, and multiple government agencies are taking steps to sound
the alarm for the cyber unaware and taking regulatory actions to encourage—if not mandate—that
organizations take steps to improve their cyber resilience.
The Biden Administration has already taken action that is specific to transportation. The TSA on
December 2, 2021, issued Security Directive 1582-21-01: #Enhancing Public Transportation and
Passenger Railroad Cybersecurity” (the Security Directive) for each owner/operator of a passenger
railroad carrier or rail transit system. 15 APTA believes that the Security Directive applies to
approximately 23 rail transit systems.16 This Security Directive was issued simultaneously with a
similar Information Circular Surface Transportation IC-2021-01 for all surface transportation
owners/operators, whereby TSA #recommends” that they too follow the same directives. 17
Though not yet compulsory, it is expected that the TSA will eventually convert this
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recommendation into a formal security directive. The remaining critical infrastructure sectors
should expect similar mandates.
The Security Directive requires the owner/operator of an applicable passenger railroad carrier or
rail transit system to:
•

Designate a Cybersecurity Coordinator who is required to be available to TSA and CISA
24/7 to coordinate cyber practices and address any incidents;

•

Report cybersecurity incidents to CISA no later than 24 hours after a cybersecurity incident
is identified;

•

Develop and adopt a Cybersecurity Incident Response Plan; and

•

Conduct a cybersecurity vulnerability assessment using a form provided by TSA.18

An owner/operator must immediately notify TSA if it is unable to implement any of the measures
in the Security Directive and may provide a proposed alternative measure for TSA approval.
How vendors will be expected to support this and future directives is not yet defined, though the
authors expect that key transit vendors will, at a minimum, be required to mirror the above
requirements when providing critical services to public transit agencies. Vendors and agencies
should expect the regulatory regime governing cybersecurity to become more precise as more
resources are directed to addressing the growing global cyber threat.
The Biden Administration, since taking office in January 2021, has been a vocal supporter of the
need for greater engagement in cybersecurity by the Federal Government. Spurred in part by
headline grabbing hacks that have hobbled everything from U.S. fuel pipelines to healthcare
systems, there is bipartisan support for efforts to strengthen the cyber posture of the U.S. public
and private sectors.
President Biden on May 12, 2021, issued Executive Order – 14028, marking the start of a growing
bevvy of regulatory guidance coming from the White House on cyber-related matters. The
Executive Order (EO) applies specifically to federal agencies and their suppliers.
It is the policy of my Administration that the prevention, detection, assessment, and
remediation of cyber incidents is a top priority and essential to national and economic security.
The Federal Government must lead by example. All Federal Information Systems should
meet or exceed the standards and requirements for cybersecurity set forth in and issued
pursuant to this order.19
The U.S. DOT is taking further steps to support improved cyber practices and serve its
constituents. It has updated website materials to reflect the most current internal and external
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guidance on managing cyber risks, is providing much needed funding to state and local
transportation agencies that have struggled to fund cybersecurity activity, and is funding research
in all modes to identify ways to make agencies more cyber resilient.20
The FTA has also added cybersecurity as part of the Triennial Review of grantees and is in the
process of developing cybersecurity expectations for grantees that the FTA can assess. It is not
unreasonable to assume that the FTA expectation will align with the requirements outlined in the
Security Directive21
In addition to the steps taken by the Biden Administration to strengthen the cyber capabilities of
the U.S. defense and intelligence systems, the Office of Management and Budget, on January 26,
2022, released a memo to the heads of all executive departments and agencies outlining the U.S.
Government"s move toward #zero trust” cybersecurity principles.22
“The foundational tenet of the Zero Trust Model is that no actor, system, network, or service
operating outside or within the security perimeter is to be trusted. Instead, we must verify
anything and everything attempting to establish access. It is a dramatic paradigm shift in
philosophy of how we secure our infrastructure, networks, and data, from verify once at the
perimeter to continual verification of each user, device, and application, and transaction.”

The detailed memo instructs Federal agencies and offices on how the government intends to
implement EO 14028 and the specific standards and objectives that need to be in place by the end
of Fiscal Year 2024. The memo specifically cites contractors and partners (i.e., individuals or
organizations external to the agency but with access to the agency system) as needing to comply
with security protocols such as the use of multi-factor authentication. As agencies work to
implement more of these practices into their own operations, the authors expect that more will be
required of vendors.
3.4.1 Other Regulatory Activity
In addition to the above, the following activity around cyber risk management is occurring that
may (eventually) effect the public transit vendor ecosystem:
U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)
The Department of Defense in November 2020 began using the Cybersecurity Maturity Model
Certification (CMMC), which is a unifying standard for vendors to ensure they implement
cybersecurity across the Defense Industrial Base (DIB).
The CMMC program includes cyber protection standards for companies in the defense industrial
base (DIB). By incorporating cybersecurity standards into acquisition programs, CMMC provides
the Department assurance that contractors and subcontractors are meeting DoD’s cybersecurity
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requirements. The DIB is the target of increasingly frequent and complex cyberattacks by
adversaries and non-state actors. Dynamically enhancing DIB cybersecurity to meet these evolving
threats, and safeguarding the information that supports and enables our warfighters, is a top
priority for the Department. CMMC is a key component of the Department’s expansive DIB
cybersecurity effort.23
Again, the CMMC currently applies only to contractors in the DIB; however, procurement
practices that start in the defense arena regularly move into the non-defense arena, and
procurement and cybersecurity professionals both anticipate this transition.
United States Congress
Congress has also been very active in regulating cybersecurity over the past year. In addition to the
multitude of bills making their way through Congress, Congress passed several pieces of legislation
in 2021 having significant cybersecurity implications for the transit industry.
One important piece of legislation is the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), passed by
Congress in November 2021, investing over $1 trillion of federal money to strengthen the nation"s
infrastructure and fund other key programs and initiatives.24 Because cybersecurity is viewed as one
of the most vulnerable and critical components of the nation"s infrastructure, cybersecurity
funding, enhancement, and maturity are woven throughout the bill. The IIJA provides new
mandates for establishing cybersecurity plans and adopting cybersecurity #maturity models” that
standardize cybersecurity policies and practices. The Act also provides assistance for businesses,
state and local governments, and other entities to prepare for and protect against cyberattacks.
The bill allocates approximately $2 billion to strengthen the nation’s cyber defenses. The IIJA’s
notable cybersecurity appropriations include:
•

$1 billion for grants to improve state and local government cybersecurity;

•

$250 million to fund the Rural and Municipal Utility Advanced Cybersecurity Grant and
Technical Assistance Program—a program designed to support public utilities and other
eligible entities;

•

$250 million to develop “advanced cybersecurity applications and technologies for the
energy sector”;

•

$20 million per year for fiscal year 2022, and every year thereafter until 2028, to create a
Cyber Response and Recovery Fund to help public and private entities respond to a
significant cyber incident;
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•

$158 million for the US Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology
Directorate to fund “critical infrastructure security and resilience research, development,
test, and evaluation”;

•

$35 million to CISA for “risk management operations and stakeholder engagement and
requirements”; and

•

$21 million to fund the recently created Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD).

Another significant piece of legislation impacting transportation is the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for the Fiscal Year 2022.25 The NDAA includes several important
public transportation provisions, including specifics on cybersecurity and transit security grants.26
For example, the NDAA:
•

Requires the Director of the CISA to establish a program, to be known as “CyberSentry”,
to provide continuous monitoring and detection of cybersecurity risks to critical
infrastructure entities that own or operate industrial control systems (ICS) that support
national critical functions, upon request and subject to the consent of the owner or operator.
Under a CyberSentry partnership agreement, CyberSentry will provide technical
assistance, such as continuous monitoring of ICS and the information systems that support
such systems, detection of cybersecurity risk to such ICS, and other cybersecurity services
as agreed upon;27

•

Requires the Secretary of DHS to prioritize the assignment of TSA and DHS officers and
intelligence analysts to locations with participating state, local, and regional fusion centers
in jurisdictions with high-risk surface transportation assets to enhance the security of such
assets, including by providing timely information sharing regarding threats of terrorism,
targeted violence, and other threats. Under the provision, the DHS Secretary is required
to make security clearances available to appropriate owners and operators of surface
transportation assets to foster greater sharing of classified information relating to threats of
terrorism, and other threats to surface transportation assets;28

•

Expands the operating use of funds for the public transportation security assistance grant
program to include “associated backfill” (e.g., backfilling personnel attending an approved
training course or program);29 and

•

Requires the Government Accountability Office to conduct a review of the public
transportation security assistance program and report to Congress no later than one year
after the date of enactment of this Act, and again no later than five years after enactment.30

One of the requirements that came out of FY 2021 NDAA was to implement a CSC
recommendation that CISA establish a Cybersecurity Advisory Committee (CSAC). 31 The
CSAC was established in June 2021 and named the first 23 of the 35 members in December 2021.
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The CSAC is directed to establish subcommittees for information exchange, critical infrastructure,
risk management, and public and private partnerships. The members, who include representatives
from industry, government technology, and security leaders, will advise the CISA Director on the
agency's policies and programs.
On March 15, 2022, President Biden signed into law the omnibus spending law which, in part,
covered entities to report cyber incidents and ransom payments. The relevant portion of this law,
titled the Cyber Incident Report for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 proposes reporting
requirements for incidents, establishes new programs to curtail ransomware attacks and encourages
information sharing between government agencies.32
Opportunities for vendors to leverage this regulatory activity to better support their public transit
clients and to differentiate themselves in the industry through the maturity of their security
practices are expanding and accelerating. Vendors that can help their current and future clients
anticipate and comply with regulatory guidance and mandates are likely to find their services in
high demand.
!
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4. Recommendations
The authors of this report believe there are several steps transit agencies and their vendor
community can take to strengthen their collective cybersecurity posture, all while maintaining a
state of operational resilience and readiness. These measures require executive focus and
investment across the transit ecosystem. This includes the need for a robust regulatory environment
explicitly enforced by the appropriate U.S. government agencies and departments overseeing their
critical infrastructure sector. Consistent with DHS’s Transportation Systems Sector Cybersecurity
Framework Implementation Guidance 33 and NIST Framework for Improving Critical
Infrastructure Cybersecurity,34 the following recommendations are provided.
Vendors
•

Vendors for critical systems should make available a security lead to assist the agency CSO
in the management of the agency’s risk.

•

Vendors should establish a cadence for periodic and independent security audits and
penetration testing of their own environments. The results should be provided to their
agency clients along with a mutually acceptable and binding commitment to a set of actions
and timeframes necessary to mitigate any identified risks.

•

Vendors should engage in existing public-private security information sharing forums and
codify procedures for how relevant data is submitted to and from all member organizations
for common benefit. Key among these groups are:
o APTA’s Control Communications Security Working Group (CCSWG)
o APTA’s Enterprise Cybersecurity Working Group (ECSWG)
o Surface and Public Transportation ISAC

Transit Agencies
•

Transit agencies should integrate their cyber risk management program with their existing
physical security risk management organization and infrastructure, creating a holistic ERM
program.
o Evaluations of existing plans should be discussed and approved by the agency’s
enterprise risk committee.
o Transit agency security policies should be updated to include existing standards,
activities, requirements, and other elements introduced by combining physical and
cyber risk management.
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o Existing security training should be augmented with cybersecurity training for all
agency personnel.
•

Transit agencies should elevate security within the organization by appointing a CSO who
has the authority, investment, and responsibility for both existing physical security
operations, as well as the information and cyber security domains.

•

An executive-level enterprise risk committee, chaired by the CSO, should be established
that includes, at a minimum, the chief financial officer, chief legal officer, and the head of
operations.

•

Transit agencies should engage in existing public-private security information sharing
forums and codify procedures for how relevant data is submitted to and from all member
organizations for common benefit. Key among these groups are:
o APTA’s Control Communications Security Working Group (CCSWG)
o APTA’s Enterprise Cybersecurity Working Group (ECSWG)
o Surface and Public Transportation ISAC

•

Transit agencies should immediately identify and evaluate all software and hardware that
is EOL with no opportunity for updates or security patches. If such technologies are
identified, every attempt should be made to reduce and/or eliminate reliance on them with
a plan in place to acquire an appropriate replacement.

Associations
•

APTA, working with other stakeholders, should develop third-party risk management and
oversight standards. Given the nature of the dependencies across the supply chain between
transit operators and their vendors, it is vital that this standards development effort include
the participation of professionals from disciplines such as procurement, physical security,
cybersecurity, and legal.

•

APTA and other industry support organizations should integrate the third-party risk
management and oversight standards into templates for contract language, RFPs, and
other artifacts that operators can rely on to engage the vendor community.

•

APTA, working with its stakeholders, should develop a comprehensive security
questionnaire and assessment guide that transit operators can have vendors complete prior
to submitting a proposal. This questionnaire should be based on regulatory guidance and,
in its absence, should follow standards outlined by the NIST Risk Management
Framework and Cybersecurity Framework.
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•

APTA, working with other stakeholders, should create minimum guidelines for
cybersecurity audits, penetration tests, and other tools to understand enterprise risk in the
public transit environment.

•

APTA, working with other stakeholders, should provide guidance on the size and scope of
investments that operators should make in risk management to operationalize all aspects
of their security program, including managing cyber risk.

U.S. Government
DHS and U.S. DOT should create a Sector Cybersecurity Executive with dedicated investment
and authority to establish sector and subsector cybersecurity guidance.
•

DHS and U.S. DOT should prioritize updating the 2015 Transportation Systems Sector
Cybersecurity Framework Implementation Guidance to reflect the advent of CAVs.

•

The FTA should require all procurements using federal dollars to include and fund basic
security maintenance when software and firmware are procured.

•

The FTA should require that all transit agencies meet the basic requirements set forth in
TSA Security Directive 1582-21-01: “Enhancing Public Transportation and Passenger
Railroad Cybersecurity for Passenger Rail.”

•

FTA, working with DHS, should create an attestation program whereby transit CEOs are
required to attest that their organization has met TSA approved cybersecurity standards
prior to receiving federal funds.

•

The FTA should create an attestation program whereby transit CEOs are required to attest
that their organization has completed an annual cybersecurity audit prior to receiving
funding.

•

Congress should increase funding to DHS and the U.S. DOT to develop and promulgate
a set of minimal cybersecurity standards and tools for their promotion.

•

Congress should increase formula grant funding to transit agencies to ensure that they have
sufficient resources to meet the minimal cybersecurity standards established above.

•

Congress should ensure through its oversight powers that the U.S. DOT and DHS work
together to improve cybersecurity preparedness within the TSS.

!
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5. Conclusion
Building a cyber-risk aware culture in public transit will take time and require resources as
operators work to design and integrate comprehensive risk management strategies. Doing so in a
timely and effective manner will require that each of the stakeholders identified in this report—
transit agencies, vendors, associations, and government—do their part in support of maturing the
industry"s cyber capabilities.
In the last few years, cyber-attacks on transportation have increased, and transit agencies, along
with every other sector of the economy have become a target for nefarious actors seeking to disrupt
operations, be it for personal or political gain. The avenues to exploit this vital infrastructure will
continue to evolve along with the technology that enables the industry to meet its core operations
and customer demands. As these technologies are further embedded in operations, new
vulnerabilities will arise, and organizations need to be prepared to adapt and respond. With
expanded and focused risk management strategies, continuing education, and a willingness to
evolve with the threat environment, public transit agencies have the ability to institute policies and
practices that will continue their positive record of delivering services with safety and quality.
Accounting for risk today will foster greater resiliency and preparedness for tomorrow.
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Appendix A: Literature Review and Available Support
Both the public and private sectors have developed a great deal of cybersecurity guidance over the
past two decades. Cybersecurity experts will tell you that the tools used to manage cybersecurity
and associated threats do not vary greatly across industries, but that some industries are more
mature in their understanding when it comes to managing cyber risks. Industries such as the
financial management industry, where billions of dollars are moved digitally every minute, have
been forced to invest heavily in cybersecurity protection. Other industries, such as the transit
industry, which has traditionally been a hardware-based industry relying largely on firmware and
closed networks, have not faced the same urgency until recently.
The 2020 Report observes that #[t]he existing cybersecurity guidance for public transit is spread
across numerous government and industry entities. . . [and that] federal resources exist for agencies
to improve their cybersecurity readiness.”35 The same baseline documents are at the core of every
industry cybersecurity program. Despite industry differences, cybersecurity maturity models and
the assessment practices used to strengthen policies, procedures, and practices are transferable.
One of the key foundations of cybersecurity programs across any industry comes from the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). NIST is a non-regulatory agency that has no
authority to dictate the use of any standard, but its standards carry significant weight. The work of
NIST is defined by federal statutes, executive orders, and policies—including developing
cybersecurity standards and guidelines for federal agencies. NIST"s cybersecurity program supports
its overall mission to promote U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing
measurement science, standards, and related technology through research and development.36
NIST in 2014 released the #Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Security” in response
to Presidential Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, 37 which
called for a standardized security framework for critical infrastructure in the United States. This
guidance is not intended to be a how-to guide for cybersecurity; rather, it is a framework designed
to help a wide range of organizations assess risk and make sound decisions about prioritizing and
allocating resources to reduce the risk of compromise or failure in their computer networks. For
any organization to leverage the NIST Framework, customized implementation is required in ways
that are not necessarily obvious from the document. The guidance is equally applicable to public
and private industry.
NIST Cybersecurity Framework: Key Functions
•

Identify: develop the organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to systems,
assets, data, and capabilities;

•

Protect: develop and implement the appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery of critical
infrastructure services;
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•

Detect: develop and implement the appropriate activities to identify the occurrence of a
cybersecurity event;

•

Respond: develop and implement the appropriate activities to take action regarding a
detected cybersecurity event;

•

Recover: develop and implement the appropriate activities to maintain plans for resilience
and to restore any capabilities or services that were impaired due to a cybersecurity event.38

To further support organizations in the face of a growing cyber threat, Congress established the
Cybersecurity Information Security Agency (CISA) at the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) through the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act of 2018.39
According to DHS, “CISA is the Nation’s risk advisor, working with partners to defend against
today’s threats and collaborating to build more secure and resilient infrastructure for the future.”40
CISA coordinates a collective defense to identify and vet procedures to manage and reduce the
impact of disruption to critical infrastructure. In this role, the organization builds and coordinates
relationships across industries working with sector-specific agencies, such as the U.S. DOT, the
FTA, and the TSA, among others.
CISA’s role is to unite government and private sector partners, with a particular focus on 16
Critical Infrastructure Sectors:
There are 16 critical infrastructure sectors whose assets, systems, and networks, whether
physical or virtual, are considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or
destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national
public health or safety, or any combination thereof.41
The public transit industry is part of the Transportation Security Sector (TSS), which is one of
the 16 critical sectors. As such, the industry has direct access to CISA’s capabilities and resources,
such as intelligence analysis, data assessment, response methods development, and assistance to
manage risks to critical infrastructure that often spike from emerging threats. CISA leads a
systematic approach to manage and reduce cyber risk that includes providing services, cyber
training, support to critical infrastructure operators, and risk analysis.
The TSA, also housed within DHS, is another critical cybersecurity actor within the Federal
government. TSA"s origins date back to the days after September 11, 2001, when it was formed
as part of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. Its #mission is to protect the nation"s
transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce.”42 Given its
provenance, TSA"s original orientation centered on physical security, but the agency #is responsible
for securing the nation"s transportation systems from all threats, -- both physical and cyber.”43 In
this latter role, TSA overlaps with CISA. TSA explains the division of labor as follows:
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Although TSA has responsibility for oversight of both the physical security and cybersecurity
of the [TSS], TSA is not directly responsible for the defense of the private sector portion of
TSS information technology infrastructure. Rather, TSA serves a vital role in ensuring the
cybersecurity resilience of the TSS infrastructure and will work with the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), with its mission to protect the critical infrastructure
of the United States.44
DHS in 2015 built upon the NIST Framework and issued a document #to provide the TSS
guidance, resource direction, and a directory of options to assist a TSS organization, [including
public transit agencies], in adopting an industry-compatible version of the NIST Framework.”45
This guidance was designed both for transit agencies that have an existing risk-management
program and for agencies that do not yet have a formal cybersecurity program. 46 The TSS
Cybersecurity Framework Implementation Guidance and its companion workbook provide an
approach for Transportation Systems Sector47 owners and operators to apply the tenets of the
National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework to help reduce cyber
risks.
!
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Appendix B: Email Request to Potential Survey
Participants
Good Afternoon
As you know cybersecurity issues are top of mind for us all these days. We have seen major national
attacks with SolarWinds, Microsoft, Colonial Pipeline, and Kaseya. The transit industry has also
experienced a number of high-profile attacks on MTA, Martha’s Vineyard Ferry, SEPTA, and
Vancouver. Last year the Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI) released an important study that
should have been a wakeup call for us all Is the Transit Industry Prepared for the Cyber
Revolution? Policy Recommendation to Enhance Surface Transit Cyber Preparedness. After
surveying more than a third of American Public Transportation Association’s (APTA) public
transit members, the researchers concluded that the industry was ill prepared for the developing
cyber threat. The study was very helpful in identifying several recommendations for the Federal
Transit Administration, APTA, and public transit operators, many of which are being
implemented and are starting to make a difference.
MTI has engaged the same researchers to look at the relationship between the public transit
operators and their vendors to identify how together they can better secure their cybersecurity
posture. The researchers immediately reached out to APTA and its Business Members Board of
Governors to engage their support. We have met several times over the past few months as the
researchers developed a report outline, survey guide and interview list. Their intent is to interview
a representative sample of public transit operators and vendors to better understand how they
currently work together to manage their cybersecurity exposure and what they can do to make
improvements.
The purpose of this study is to highlight best practices and to identify resources and tools that we
all should be taking advantage of going forward. We are all engaged in some level of cybersecurity
protection, but can all afford to do more. Only by working together - agencies and vendors - can
we effectively mature our industry's posture against cyber threats. Moreover, this Administration
has placed a priority on cybersecurity, with new requirements and regulations on the horizon. To
the extent that we can get ahead of the curve, the better off we will be.
We recommend that you participate in this study. Clever Devices did and it was worth our time
as we learned alongside the researchers. Your organization can choose to participate anonymously
on not, it is up to you. The initial interview will take about an hour and there may be some followup depending on how the initial interview goes.
Attached you will find an abstract of the study as well as a copy of the survey questions so that you
can make sure that you have the correct individual or individuals available for the interview. Scott
Belcher, the MTI Research Associate, will follow-up with you to answer any questions and to
schedule an interview.
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Best regards,
Buddy Coleman
Chief Customer Officer
Clever Devices
Vice Chair, APTA, BMBG
Polly Hanson
Senior Director of Security, Risk and Emergency Management
American Public Transit Association
Scott Belcher
Research Associate
Mineta Transportation Institute
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Appendix C: Interview Guide
Date
Name:
Job Title:

Organization:

Email:

Phone:

Core Questions
Tell me about your company—What services do you offer? Who are your customers?
Which of these services do you provide to your transit industry customers? How?
Tell me about how you view the cyber risk landscape for the U.S. transit industry
Who manages the cyber relationship with you—the vendor—from within the transit provider?
What about from your organization?
What does interaction with your transit client(s) look like? Are you meeting regularly? Providing
risk assessments on a scheduled basis? Only connecting when there’s an issue? Is it documented?
Have your transit clients established specific cyber responsibilities/expectations from you with
respect to your operations? With respect to your provision of services? If so, how? Do you have a
service level agreement in place?
What sets you apart from other vendors serving transit clients?
The transit industry is behind in incorporating cybersecurity into enterprise risk management
practices—what are you doing to help your clients with this?
Company/Service Details
Do you have a cybersecurity program in place? If not formal, please describe activities engaged to
secure your systems.
If a formal program is in place, please describe your operations by category:
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Security Operations
Tell me about your general approach to threat detection, incident response, and recovery within
your own company. As it relates to your transit clients.
Security Architecture
Tell me about your company’s approach to network security architecture—core components,
frequency of risk evaluations, special considerations for the transit industry
Governance
What, if any, requirements coming from outside your organization govern the services you provide
to your clients?
What kind of guidance or interface do you have with local, state, or federal government regarding
cybersecurity in general or your services more specifically?
What kind of processes, procedures, and controls do you have in place to ensure compliance and
execution of your cybersecurity program? Are your clients involved? If so, how so?
User Education
Do you offer your staff training in information and network security to improve their baseline of
understanding? What about your clients?
Threat Intelligence
How do you monitor threats to your own organization? Your clients? Proprietary network? Thirdparty threat tools?
Risk Assessment
What does your company’s risk assessment process entail? How frequently do you provide this to
your clients?
Risk Management
What does the delivery of risk management services look like for the transit industry? (i.e., risk
appetite for a public-serving organization, resiliency, and business continuity)
NOTE// Vendor Interview Guide: The goal of the vendor interview is to gain a better
understanding about the services delivered to transit providers, the sophistication of such
services—specifically as pertains to the identification, prevention, and response to infosec risks—
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and the driving force behind the quality of these services. The objective is to find a few good
examples of vendors doing cybersecurity right. Secondary goal is to induce vendor to take a closer
look at their cybersecurity practices, and to seed the idea that good cybersecurity hygiene can be a
competitive advantage.
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
AASHTO

American Association of State Highway Transportation Officials

APTA

American Public Transit Association

AVL

Automatic Vehicle Locator

BMBG

Business Members Board of Governors (APTA)

CAV

Connected and Automated Vehicles

CCSWG

Control Communications Security Working Group (APTA)

CISA

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

CISO

Chief Information Security Officer

CMMC

Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification

CMMI

Capability Maturity Model Integration

COSO

Committee of Sponsoring Organizations

CRO

Chief Risk Officer

CSC

Cyberspace Solarium Commission

CSAC

Cybersecurity Advisory Committee

CSO

Chief Security Officer

CTO

Chief Technology Officer

DIB

Defense Industrial Base

DHS

United States Department of Homeland Security

DoD

United States Department of Defense

DOT

United States Department of Transportation

ECSWG

Enterprise Cybersecurity Working Group (APTA)
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EO

Executive Order

EOL

End-of-Life

ERM

Enterprise Risk Management

FedRAMP

Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program

FTA

Federal Transit Administration

GAO

Government Accounting Office

GPS

Global Positioning Systems

ICS

Industrial Control Systems

ICT

Information Communications Technology

IIJA

Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act

ISO

International Organization for Standardization

IT

Information Technology

ITS

Intelligent Transportation Systems

MSSP

Managed Security Service Providers

MTA

Metropolitan Transportation Authority

MTI

Mineta Transportation Institute

NCF

National Critical Functions

NDAA

National Defense Authorization Act

NIST

National Institute of Standards and Technology

OCE

Office of the Cybersecurity Executive

OMB

Office of Management and Budget

ONCD

Office of the National Cyber Director

OT

Operational Technology
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PCI

Payment Card Industry

PII

Personally Identifiable Information

PT-ISAC

Public Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center

RFP

Request for Proposal

SEPTA

Southeastern Philadelphia Transportation Authority

SOC

Security Operations Center

SCRM

Supply Chain Risk Management

SRMA

Sector Risk Management Agencies

TRB

Transportation Research Board

TSA

Transportation Security Agency

TSS

Transportation Security Sector
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